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Abstract
In this paper we address the issue of investors’ asset allocation decisions when they delegate
portfolio management to an agent. Contrary to predictions from traditional financial theory,
it is found that investors may not induce their fund manager to allocate the funds to the asset
with the highest return. Instead they may wish to induce trade in a particular asset, because
another manager is trading in it and despite the presence of a more profitable alternative.
Doing so allows investors to write an efficiency-improving relative-performance contract.
On the other hand, herding leads principals to design wage contracts strategically, resulting
in more aggressive and thus less profitable trade in equilibrium. We show that investors herd
in their asset allocation decision, when managers are sufficiently risk averse or when the
precision of their information is low. We also show that when principals can decide whether
or not to disclose information about their manager’s performance, they will not do so and
thus the problem of designing contracts strategically can be avoided.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G14, G23, D82
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11. Introduction
A large amount of assets on stock and bond markets are traded by
professional portfolio managers who are employed by institutional investors. At
the end of 1994, institutional investors held US$ 2.9 trillion in US equities, which
amounts to 46.6% of the total. This compares to 44.5% at the end of 1990 and
26.7% at the end of 1970.1
One of the most important decisions an investor faces is the choice of
assets in which to invest. Traditional financial theory like the CAPM predicts that
this choice should be entirely determined by the risk return characteristics of an
asset. Contrary to this prediction, we show that investors may wish to induce their
respective fund managers to trade in a particular asset, because another manager
is trading in it and despite the presence of a more profitable alternative. Investors
may thus herd in their asset allocation decision, with the result that if there are
two assets with identical characteristics, the market for one asset displays
informed trade and highly efficient prices, while no informed trade and inefficient
prices occur in the market for the other asset.
The driving force for our results is the moral hazard problem between the
investor and the fund manager. We consider a model with two principals who
each delegate the management of their portfolio to a different agent. The agency
problem considered here features two instances of moral hazard. Firstly,
managers need to acquire costly information to learn about the future value of an
asset, where the acquired information is unknown to the principal. Secondly, a
manager chooses a trading strategy which is unobservable by the principal. Before
offering a wage contract to his manager, each principal chooses one of two assets
in which he wishes his fund manager to trade.
When a manager is the only informed trader in a market, a manager’s wage
contract is solely based on individual performance. When another fund manager
trades in the same market, comparative performance information (henceforth
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 See New York Stock Exchange Fact Book (1995).
2CPI) becomes available and wages can be based on relative performance. As is
well known from the literature on CPI (see for example Holmstrom, 1982 and
Mookherjee, 1984), this is desirable because it improves the insurance-efficiency
trade-off of contracting in an agency problem with moral hazard. We show that
the benefits of CPI and thus herding increase with the managers’ degree of risk
aversion and decrease with the precision of information about asset value.
In contrast to other treatments of herding, our results suggest that herding
might not be such a bad thing after all. In our setting, herding is induced by the
principals in order to mitigate the inefficiencies associated with delegation, rather
than an instance of inefficiency, as for example in Scharfstein and Stein (1990).
Moreover, herding increases the efficiency of prices of the asset in which agents
herd, rather than reducing it as in Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1992).
Furthermore, we identify the strategic use of comparative performance
information to induce aggressive trading (high trading intensities) by fund
managers as a cost of using CPI. In most of the existing literature (see
Holmstrom, 1982, and Mookherjee, 1984) the use of CPI comes at no cost2,
because one agent’s action does not affect the “productivity” of the other agent.
In our setting, however, informed trade by one agent exerts a negative externality
over the profitability of the other agent’s trade.
The managers’ optimal trading strategies depend on the wage contracts
they receive. This allows principals to use wage contracts strategically in order to
induce a more favourable type of trading behaviour. Wage contracts thus do not
only serve the purpose of mitigating inefficiencies arising from delegation, but
also affect the market interaction between the managers. Contracts may thus also
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 Meyer and Vickers (1997) is an exception to this. They show that in a dynamic setting, CPI may be
undesirable, because it exacerbates the ratchet effect, i.e. reduces an agent’s incentives to exert effort ex ante,
because he anticipates that a high effort level today will result in a more demanding contract tomorrow.
3be used strategically, as, e.g., in Vickers (1985), where delegation is a strategic
device, when two or more principals interact.3
When designing wage contracts principals do not take into account that a
higher trading intensity of their own manager exerts a negative externality over
the other manager’s profitability of trade. Therefore, the equilibrium in our model
features wage contracts that induce trading intensities that are above the collusive
level.
In order to study the costs and benefits of comparative performance
information, we also consider the case where there is only one market, but
principals can ex ante decide whether or not to disclose information about their
manager’s performance. We show that in equilibrium, principals will never
disclose performance information and can thus use the endogenous choice of
information disclosure as a device to avoid the problems arising from strategic
interaction. We characterise the set of parameters for which investors are better
off when the information disclosure decision is endogenous compared to the case
where they are forced to disclose this information. This problem is interesting
from a regulator’s point of view who may have to decide whether or not funds
should be obliged to disclose performance information.
Other authors (e.g. Scharfstein and Stein, 1990, Trueman, 1994, and
Zwiebel, 1995) have shown that herding among agents who are evaluated relative
to their peers might result due to reputational concerns. In this paper we neglect
reputational concerns and focus instead on explicit incentives. Herding, however,
remains an important issue, as agents’ explicit incentives are based on relative
performance and hence one agent’s actions do affect another agent’s incentives.
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 Kyle and Wang (1997) develop a model of strategic delegation of fund management activities. They focus
on the possibility of survival of irrational agents, who are overconfident in their own forecasting ability and
show that such traders can survive because they are committed to trading aggressively, thus crowding out to
some extent other informed agents’ trades. Their model, however, only deals with the strategic aspect of
delegation and does not examine the effect of incentive contracts in such relationships.
4Herding in our treatment occurs in the sense that one principal induces acquisition
of a piece of information, because another agent acquires the same piece of
information. This corresponds to the concept of herding as in Brennan (1990),
Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1992), and Dow and Gorton (1994).4
The paper closest to ours is Maug and Naik (1996). They examine the
question of asset allocation in a model with only one principal agent relationship.
One of two available assets is characterised by the presence of an informed (profit
maximising) trader, while there is no informed trade in the other asset. They
explore the design of wage contracts to the fund manager and investigate under
which circumstances the principal accepts herding by the agent, despite the
reduction in expected trading profits resulting from having more than one
informed trader in that asset.
In contrast to our treatment, Maug and Naik assume that the choice of
asset is non-contractible and thus herding may occur when it is not desired by the
principal. More importantly, they assume that agents submit orders sized so as to
maximise expected trading profits, rather than the agent’s expected utility, given a
specific wage contract. However, in order for the agency problem to be
meaningful, order size must be endogenously determined by the fund manager.
The trading intensity thus constitutes an additional dimension of moral hazard.
Moreover, by assuming that there is only one principal-agent pair, Maug
and Naik do not capture the element of strategic interaction between the two
principals, which turns out to be crucial when contracts are based on CPI.
Another novelty of our model is that we explicitly consider the impact of
wage contracts on the trading strategy of the fund manager. Papers dealing with
the question of optimal wage contracts for fund managers include Bhattacharya
and Pfleiderer (1985), Stoughton (1993) and Heinkel and Stoughton (1994). In
their models, fund managers can acquire superior information about asset values
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 It contrasts with herding due to informational cascades as in Welch (1992), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and
Welch (1992) and Banerjee (1992) among others.
5and then either reveal the information directly through an announcement, or
indirectly through the portfolio choice. Wages are then based on some measure of
forecast error.
In their models the problems of direct and indirect revelation of
information are isomorphic and hence it is justifiable to study the problem of an
information announcement, as the equivalent of a delegated portfolio
management problem. This equivalence, however, hinges on the restrictive
assumption that asset prices are perfectly inelastic. If asset prices are elastic, the
trading decision affects prices and therefore the economic value of the gathered
information. The problem of forecasting the return on an asset and the problem of
portfolio choice thus cease to be isomorphic.
In order to model the managers’ behaviour on the asset market, we move
away from the perfectly competitive Rational Expectation Equilibrium as in
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). Instead we consider a simple noise trader model in
the spirit of Kyle (1985) which incorporates monopolistic behaviour of
speculators in the presence of noise traders and a market maker who sets the price
such as to break even in expectation on the trades he executes.
The paper will proceed as follows. In Section 2 we develop the basic
framework. Section 3 derives equilibrium trading and price setting strategies as a
function of the contracting parameters and the assets chosen by the principals.
Section 4 derives the optimal linear incentive scheme under non-herding and
herding, and illustrates the impact on equilibrium trading strategies. Section 5
contains the main results concerning the principals’ choice of herding versus non-
herding. Section 6 endogenises the choice of disclosure of performance
information and illustrates when it would be desirable for principals to have that
choice. Section 7 concludes. The Appendix provides the proofs.
62. The model
There are six agents in the economy: two principals Pi (i=1,2), two fund
managers Fi and two market makers Ml (l=A,B). Each principal employs one fund
manager, where the fund managers are assigned to a principal before the start of
the game. We assume that there are many fund managers that could be hired and
therefore the principal is able to extract all the surplus from the fund manager’s
activity.
When contracting with a manager, each principal first determines in which
of two available assets l=A,B he wishes his manager to trade.5 It is assumed to be
ex post observable and verifiable in which market the manager traded. Each
principal Pi can thus offer a contract that will force manager Fi to trade in asset li
as determined in the contract. For notational simplicity we will not include the
wage payments in case of trading in the "wrong" market and instead formulate the
wage payments given the correct choice. The choice of assets becomes common
knowledge among all agents and cannot be renegotiated.
Subsequently, the principals simultaneously offer a wage contract to their
manager who decide whether to accept or reject it. A wage contract between
principal Pi and agent Fi is a triple Ci ={αi, βi, γi}, which determines wage
payments wi from principal Pi to agent Fi as
wi =αi + βipii - γipij i=1,2   j=1,2,   i≠j (1)
where pii denotes agent i’s realised trading profits. Let EBi(Ci ,Cj |li, lj ) denote
principal Pi’s expected payoff when the principals choose contracts {Ci ,Cj}, given
that they have already chosen assets {li, lj }.
Both fund managers have CARA utility, with the same coefficient of
absolute risk aversion r:
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 Funds typically market themselves by referring to a particular investment objective and style. Therefore,
before performance comparisons between fund managers are made, the funds are typically clustered into
groups that differ through the market they invest in and their investment style. For an appraisal of the choice
of the clusters that serve as benchmarks of performance comparison see Tierney and Winston (1991).
7Ui (wi, k) = -exp (-r (wi - ki))
Where ki =0 if agent i does not acquire information and ki = c with c > 0 if
he does. Agents have reservation wage Wi.
Once managers have accepted a wage contract, its terms become common
knowledge to all agents and wage contracts cannot be renegotiated.6 The
managers then decide whether or not to acquire information about the value of the
previously chosen asset and subsequently trade on their information. The trading
strategy is chosen by each manager such that it constitutes a Nash equilibrium
between traders and market maker in the trading subgame.
Each of the two assets is traded in only one market l=A,B and in each
market there is one market maker Ml with whom trades can be executed. Since
each asset is only traded in one market, the choice of asset in which to trade is
equivalent to a choice of market and we will subsequently refer to the choice of a
market.
When a manager acquires information he receives a noisy signal ~yl  about
asset value ~xl . The ex ante relationship between the signal and true value is given
by
~ ~ ~x y zl l l= +
where ~ ~ ( , ) ~ ~ ( , )y N V z N Vl l y l l z0 0,   . Both random variables are independent of one
another and ~zl   is the residual noise of asset value after information has been
acquired.
Subsequently the agent can submit an order ti for the asset to the market
maker who sets the price of the asset at which he is willing to absorb all the order
flow. Trading thus results in profits
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 This corresponds to the assumption typically made in the strategic delegation literature, whereby contracts
are publicly announced and cannot be secretly renegotiated. Dewatripont (1988) and Caillaud, Jullien, and
Picard (1995) find precommitment effects through public announcements of contracts, even when contracts
can be secretly renegotiated.
8( )~ ~ ~pi i i l lt x p= − . (2)
Apart from the order by the informed speculator, total order flow in each
asset contains a noisy component ~nl , which is normally distributed with mean
zero and variance Vln.7 We assume that all random variables { ~ , ~ ,~ , ~ , ~ , ~y y z z n nA B A B A B }
are independent of one another.
Market makers are assumed to be in Bertrand competition, which implies
that they set prices so as to break even in expectation. Hence, the price is set such
that it equals the expected value of the asset, given the information contained in
total order flow. Thus, pl =E[xl|Tl], where Tl denotes total order flow in market l.
The presence of noise traders ensures that the speculators’ orders will not
perfectly reveal their information about asset value.
Table 1 illustrates the sequence of games that are played. Stages 1 and 2 of
the game are simultaneous move games between the two principals. Stage 3 is a
simultaneous move game between the two managers and the market maker.
Table 1: The sequence of games played between the principals and the agents
Definition: An equilibrium is defined as {l1*, l2*, C1*, C2*, t1*, t2*, pA*, pB*}, such
that for i, j = 1,2;  i≠j and for li , lj∈{A,B}:
(i) The price function pl(Tl) and the trading strategy ti(yl) satisfy:
(a) ti* ∈ arg max E[Ui(wi, c)|Ci*, Cj*, li*, lj*, yl] 
                                                       
7
 The rationale for the random trading component is the presence of liquidity traders, who may have a
hedging need and therefore trade in asset l.
Principals
simultaneously choose
an asset in which they
wish the fund manager
to invest.
Stage 3Stage 2Stage 1
Principals simultaneously
choose the parameters of
the wage contract, given the
choice of assets made in the
first stage.
Given the asset choice and
the parameters of the wage
contracts, agents choose
their trading strategy as a
Nash equilibrium in the
trading game.
9(b) pl* =E[xl|Tl, Ci*, Cj*, li*, lj*] 
(ii) The wage contracts {Ci*, Cj*} solve
max
, ,α β γi i i
 EBi(Ci, Cj| li*, lj* ) = (1-βi)Epii + γiEpij - αi (P)
s.t.
E[Ui(wi, c)|Ci, Cj, li*, lj*] ≥ E[Ui(wi, 0)|Ci, Cj, li*, lj*] (IC)
E[Ui(wi, c)|Ci, Cj, li*, lj*] ≥ U(Wi) (PC)
Denote by EBi(li, lj) ≡ EBi(Ci*, Cj*| li, lj).
(iii) The choice of assets (li*, lj*) satisfies:
EBi(li*, lj*) ≥ EBi(li, lj*)
(iv) Each principal’s expected payoff in equilibrium satisfies an individual
rationality constraint
EBi(li*, lj*) ≥ 0.
To summarise, each agent chooses a trading strategy maximising his
expected utility, given a price function of the market maker, given his own
contract and the opponent’s contract and given the choice of assets by the
principals. Anticipating the managers’ behaviour in the trading subgame,
principals choose wage contracts so as to maximise their expected payoff (P),
given the choice of assets {l1, l2}, where wage contracts have to satisfy the
managers’ participation constraints (PC) and incentive compatibility constraints
(IC). Moreover, we require that the choice of assets constitutes a Nash
equilibrium.
3. Equilibrium strategies in the trading subgame
In this section we solve the last stage of the game as a function of the outcome of
the previous two stages. This corresponds to finding a price function and trading
strategies according to definition (i). Throughout this section it is assumed that
10
both fund managers accept the contract and that the contracts are incentive
compatible, i.e. managers actually do acquire information.
There are two different cases that need to be distinguished. First, agents
may be induced to get informed about and trade in different assets, which will be
called the non-herding case (i.e. l1≠l2). Second, agents may be induced to get
informed about and trade in the same asset, which will be called the herding case
(i.e. l1=l2).
3.1 Trading equilibrium under non-herding
Proposition 1:  There exists a unique linear equilibrium of the trading subgame
when agents get informed about and trade in different assets. Assume (w.l.o.g.)
that agent 1 trades in asset A, while agent 2 trades in asset B. Then equilibrium
order sizes are given by
t yN N A1 1= δ   , (3)
and the price setting strategy of the market maker for asset A is given by 
( )~ ~ ~p t nA AN A= +λ 1 ,  (4)
where δ1N and λAN are given by equation (9) and (10) in the Appendix.
Agent 2’s trading strategy and the price setting strategy by the market
maker for asset B are given by the same formula with indices changed
appropriately.
Proof see Appendix.
Properties of the trading equilibrium under non-herding
In the non herding equilibrium, the amount of trade of one agent is entirely
independent of the other agent’s trading decision, of the relative performance
parameter γi as well as the characteristics of the other asset. The reason for
independence is that agents have CARA utility.
11
Note that δN is an implicit function of r, β, Vy, Vz, Vn, given by substituting
(10) into (9). Using the implicit function theorem it is straightforward to show
that ∂δ∂β
N
< 0
 and ∂δ∂
N
r
< 0 , i.e. the optimal trading intensity is a decreasing
function of the incentive payment and the degree of risk aversion. From this we
can also conclude that the first-best trading intensity δ*≡ δN(r=0) is larger than the
one that will be chosen by a risk averse agent whose incentive payment β is
positive. This implies an agency cost due to suboptimally small trading intensities
when the trading decision is delegated to a risk averse agent.
3.2 Trading equilibrium under herding
Proposition 2: There exists a unique linear equilibrium of the trading game under
herding. Assume (w.l.o.g.) that both agents trade in asset A. The equilibrium
trading strategy for agent 1 is given by
t1
H
 = δ1H yA,        (5)
and the price setting strategy of the market maker MA is given by
( )~ ~ ~ ~p t t nA AH A= + +λ 1 2  , (6)
with δ 1H  and λ AH  given by equations (13) and (14) in the Appendix. Trader 2’s
trading intensity δ 2H  is also given by equation (13), with indices changed
appropriately. Moreover, pB = 0.
Proof see Appendix.
Properties of the trading equilibrium under herding
First, note that when agents herd in say asset A, no informed trade in asset
B occurs and hence pB = 0, i.e. the price for asset B contains no information about
asset value.
Equation (12) in the Appendix gives trader 1’s best response in trading
intensity t1 as a linear function of the opponent’s trading intensity t2. If γ1=0, an
12
increase in t2 will lead to a decrease in t1, holding λ constant. Trading intensities
are strategic substitutes and the two managers interact like Cournot duopolists
when determining their trading strategies. On the other hand, if β1=γ1 the trading
intensity t1 increases with t2 and trading intensities are strategic complements.
Moreover, it can be verified easily, that in the case of perfect insurance for
the managers (i.e. β1=γ1, β2=γ2), the equilibrium in the trading subgame
degenerates to infinitely sized orders (δiH = ∞, i=1,2) and zero trading profits.
Since managers anticipate the outcome of the trading subgame, they would never
find costly information acquisition incentive compatible. We can therefore
already conclude that optimal wage contracts under herding cannot feature perfect
insurance.
4. Optimal wage contracts
We now turn to the optimisation problem each principal faces at the second
stage, i.e. after a choice of assets has been made. He maximises the expected
payoff from offering a contract, taking as given the contract of the other principal
and the agents’ actions they induce. At the stage where principals determine the
parameters of the wage contract, each principal Pi faces the optimisation problem
stated in definition (ii). For a pair of contracts to be an equilibrium, we require it
to be a fixed point of the best response correspondence in wage contracts of each
of the principals.
First, we will derive the optimal wage parameters of a contract for the
cases that principals induce agents to trade in different assets. Then we analyse
the case where principals induce agents to trade in the same asset.
4.1 Optimal wage contracts under non-herding
From section 3.1 we know that if agents trade in different assets, principal
Pi’s problem of choosing an optimal contract is independent of principal Pj’s
13
choice of contract. Hence, there is no strategic interaction between the principals
when designing the wage contracts. For this case we can derive the optimal wage
contract:
Proposition 3: For exp(2rc) - 1 ≤ Vy/Vz the optimal contracting parameters in the
non-herding case are given by8
αN =W,
γN = 0,
and
( ) ( )
( )β
N
y z y z y y
n y y z
u
r
u V V u V V V V
V V V uV
=
+ + + +
−
2 4 4
2
2 2 2
, (7)
where     u = e2rc-1.
If exp(2rc) - 1 > Vy/Vz there exists no contract that satisfies the agent’s incentive
compatibility constraint.
Proof see Appendix.
Hence, the optimal wage contract under non-herding features no relative
performance component (γN=0), which is not surprising, given that agents’ actions
are independent of one another and that the performance of both managers is not
correlated.
Taking the first derivative of βN with respect to r yields ∂β∂
N
r
> 0 , i.e. the
incentive payment increases with the degree of risk aversion. This contrasts with
other results in agency theory (see e.g. Milgrom and Roberts, 1992), where the
optimal incentive payment decreases with the degree of risk aversion.
The intuition for this result is as follows. In our setting the incentive
compatibility constraint (IC) is directly linked to the degree of risk aversion,
because the agent can affect the riskiness of his wage by his trading decision. In
particular, if the agent decides not to acquire information, he will optimally not
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trade at all and thereby cancel out any risk in his wage. The more risk averse an
agent is, the higher the incentive payment has to be in order to induce him to take
the risk that he necessarily incurs when trading.
Note moreover, that, as shown in Section 3, an agent’s trading intensity is a
decreasing function of β and r. Thus an increase in r not only reduces the chosen
trading intensity directly, but also indirectly through an increase in the optimal
incentive payment. Hence, as r increases the trading intensity moves further away
from its first-best level and the principal’s expected payoff decreases.
4.2 Optimal contracts under herding
Let us now turn to the contracting problem when both principals induce
their managers to trade in the same asset. As discussed in Section 3.2, managers
act as duopolists under herding, which gives rise to strategic interaction between
principals when designing the wage contract. In particular, a principal can ensure
that his agent will trade more aggressively (increase the choice of δ in the trading
subgame) by increasing the relative performance parameter γ. This can be seen
from the best response function (12) in the Appendix. The negative impact of
large order sizes on trading profits is not internalised and hence contracts offered
in equilibrium will induce trading intensities that are higher than if principals
could collude when designing the wage contracts.
Lemma 2 in the Appendix states the incentive compatibility constraint for
agents in the case of herding. With the use of Lemma 2 the programme in
definition (ii) can be solved numerically, which yields the unique and symmetric
equilibrium of the wage contracting game.
15
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Figure 1: Shows the equilibrium trading intensities as a function of the coefficient of
absolute risk aversion under optimal wage contracts in the case of herding (solid line), the
case of herding with collusion among principals (dotted line) and under non-herding (dashed
line). The first best total trading intensity is δ=2. For r>0 the trading intensity under non-
herding is always below the first best level. The trading intensity under herding is always
above the first best level and also above the collusive level. The parameter values are c=0.1,
Vn =2, Vy =0.5, Vz =1.5.
Figure 1 shows the equilibrium trading intensities as a function of the
coefficient of absolute risk aversion for the case of herding (solid line), herding
with collusion among principals (dotted line) and non-herding (dashed line).
When managers herd, the total trading intensity is above the first best level (in
this example at δ1+δ2 =2) and above the collusive level, which illustrates the
effect of strategic interaction among principals on the equilibrium trading
intensities. Moreover, total trading intensity under herding is a decreasing
function of the degree of risk aversion. As agents become more risk averse it
becomes more costly to induce them to trade aggressively, which mitigates the
strategic interaction problem.
On the other hand, as shown in section 3.1, when managers do not herd,
the optimal trading intensity is always below the first-best level and decreasing in
the coefficient of risk aversion.
16
5. The choice of herding versus non-herding
In this section we characterise the conditions under which it is a Nash
equilibrium for principals to induce managers to herd or not to herd. This
corresponds to the first stage of the game (definition (iii)), where principals
choose an asset for their manager to trade in. When making their choice,
principals take their opponents choice as given and anticipate the actions induced
in the two subsequent stages of the game.
For any choice of {l1, l2}, principals receive the expected payoff as
characterised in the previous sections. Payoffs as a function of asset choice can
thus be summarised in the following payoff matrix
Table 2: This table provides the payoff matrix for the choice of asset of each principal. Since
the wage contracts are designed after the choice of asset becomes common knowledge to all
players, the expected payoffs are given as the optimal payoffs from herding/non-herding as
characterised in the previous sections.
To highlight the importance of the insurance motive for herding, suppose
in what follows that both assets have identical characteristics, i.e. VAy = VBy , VAz =
VBz , VAn = VBn. In this case the motive for herding will not be that one asset is
inherently more profitable than another and therefore both principals prefer to
induce trading in that same asset.
An equilibrium will feature herding in one of the two assets if and only if
EB1(A,A) ≥  EB1(B,A) and EB2(A,A) ≥  EB2(A,B). By symmetry these conditions
will either both be violated or both be satisfied. Therefore, if EB1(A,A) ≥
l2=A l2=B
l1=A
l1=B
EB1(A,A), EB2(A,A)
EB1(B,B), EB2(B,B)EB1(B,A), EB2(A,B)
EB1(A,B), EB2(B,A)
17
EB1(B,A) the equilibrium displays herding (in either asset) and non-herding
otherwise.
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
Coefficient of risk aversion r
Expected payoff to the principal under herding/ non-herding
Payoff under  herding
Payoff under  non-
herding
Figure 2: Plots the expected payoff to a principal under herding (dotted line) and non-
herding (solid line). The parameters are c=0.09, Vy =0.5, Vz =1.5, Vn =1.5. Expected payoff
under optimal herding contracts is an increasing function of the degree of risk aversion over
some range of r. An increase in r mitigates the detrimental effect of strategic interaction
between the principals.
We find that the expected payoff to the principal in the herding case is an
increasing function of the coefficient of risk aversion, for r not too large. In
Figure 2 expected payoff at the optimal contract is plotted for different levels of
risk aversion.9 It can be seen that in a region where the coefficient of absolute risk
aversion is not too high, the expected payoff to the principal is increasing in the
degree of risk aversion.10 This result contrasts with other results in agency theory
(see Milgrom and Roberts) and with our result in the non-herding case, where the
agency cost increases with the degree of risk aversion, due to the fact that the
insurance-efficiency trade-off worsens as the agent becomes more risk averse.
                                                       
9
 In this and all the following simulations, parameters are chosen such that the investors’ individual
rationality constraints, given in definition (iv), are satisfied.
10
 Once the degree of risk aversion increases beyond a certain level, expected payoffs fall, because the
increasingly negative impact of the insurance need on the efficiency of the contract will dominate the effect
of “too large” order sizes.
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The intuition for this result is simple. As discussed above, both principals
face the problem of strategically designing the wage contracts of their agents such
that they are induced to trade more aggressively than would be optimal if both
principals could collude. As agents become more risk averse, it becomes more
costly to induce managers to trade aggressively. Therefore, the problem of
submitting “too large” orders is mitigated when managers become more risk
averse. On the other hand, as shown in section 4.1, an increase in the degree of
risk aversion is costly in the case where CPI is not available. Therefore herding is
a Nash equilibrium in the choice of assets for sufficiently high values of r.
Of course, expected payoff to the principal depends also on the other
parameters, namely the variance of noise trade, the variance of the signal and the
variance of the asset value ex ante. For a given ex ante variance of asset value,
consider an increase in the variance of the signal received by the traders. An
increase in Vy for constant Vy+Vz, corresponds to an increase in the information
content of the signal.11 A more informative signal means not only higher expected
trading profits, but also a reduction in residual risk. This suggests that the
insurance need and hence the case for herding, is larger when the signal precision
is low.
Figure 3 shows the set of parameters (r, Vy) for which herding is a Nash
equilibrium in the choice of assets. In this simulation Vy+Vz is constant and hence
an increase in Vy corresponds to an increase in the information content of the
signal. For a given level of risk aversion, an increase in signal precision reduces
the residual risk associated with trading and hence reduces the manager’s
insurance need. Correspondingly, herding will only occur for a low level of signal
precision. Similarly, an increase in the coefficient of absolute risk aversion raises
the manager’s insurance need and reduces the strategic interaction problem
between the principals. This increases the expected payoff to the principal of
                                                       
11
 The informativeness of the signal can be measured as Vy /(Vy+Vz), which is the regression coefficient of y
on x. It is linearly increasing in Vy, for Vy+Vz=constant.
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Figure 3: Illustrates the equilibrium choice of herding versus the non-herding decision. The
parameters are c=0.09, Vy+Vz=1.5. The solid line is the region of indifference between
herding and non-herding for Vn =2.5 and the dotted line for Vn =1.7. For a given level of risk
aversion, an increase in Vy (increase in precision of the signal) reduces the insurance need
and increases the payoff under non-herding relative to herding. Similarly, an increase in the
coefficient of risk aversion increases the insurance need and mitigates the problem of
strategic interaction amongst principals when choosing the wage parameters.
using CPI that becomes available under herding. Hence, herding is a Nash
equilibrium for high levels of risk aversion.
Moreover, we observe that the region of parameters for which herding
occurs decreases with an increase in the variance of noise trade. This seems
counterintuitive, given that an increase in the variance of noise trade increases the
execution risk for the trader (i.e. the riskiness of the clearing price after having
submitted an order). On the other hand, an increase in the variance of noise trade
leads to a flattening of the best-response functions (12) of each trader’s trading
intensities. In the contracting stage of the game, flatter best response functions in
trading intensities lead to an exacerbation of the strategic interaction problem
between the principals, which ultimately leads to a reduction in the expected
payoff from herding relative to the payoff under non-herding.12 Ceteris paribus,
                                                       
12
 The actual expected payoff from herding increases with the variance of noise trade, because trading profits
are an increasing function of the level of noise trade in the market.
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we would therefore expect to see herding in markets with lower levels of noise
trade.
6. Strategic non-disclosure of performance information
In this section we address the question of how the inefficiency of setting
the contracting parameters at values that induce too high trading intensities can be
mitigated. We will therefore focus on the case where there is only one asset and
both agents trade in that asset, i.e. the first stage of the game, when principals
choose an asset is deleted. Instead we will introduce another first stage of the
game, in which principals can choose simultaneously whether or not to release
information about their manager’s performance, once trading profits are realised.
The information disclosure decision is taken, given optimal contracting and
trading strategies in the subsequent stages of the game. The decision is assumed
to be irreversible and becomes common knowledge before contracting parameters
are chosen.
The equilibrium of the trading subgame is still given by Proposition 2,
except that γi≡0, if principal Pj does not disclose performance information.
Proposition 4: The unique Nash equilibrium in the information disclosure game is
for both principals not to disclose performance information.
Proof: Note from equation (12) in the Appendix (best response function in trading
intensities), that an increase in γi results in an increase in δi, holding λ constant.
Since j’s choice not to release information results in γi≡0, the trading intensity of
j’s opponent will be lower, when CPI is not available to him. A lower δi, however,
makes principal j better off, regardless of whether or not his opponent releases
information. Hence, it cannot be part of any Nash equilibrium for a principal to
release information about his manager’s performance.
q.e.d.
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If both principals decide not to release performance information, they are
constrained to offer individual performance contracts. Although each manager’s
equilibrium choice of action still depends on the opponent’s wage parameters,
there is now a unique β that makes the incentive compatibility constraint binding.
By omitting CPI, principals can commit to reducing the number of degrees of
freedom in the contract by one, which avoids the detrimental effect of strategic
interaction. At the same time it removes the insurance gain from offering relative
performance contracts.
Now compare the effect on principals’ expected payoffs when they play
the information disclosure game (and hence no information is released), to the
case where information is always released. This amounts to a comparison of the
benefits of using CPI (increase in the insurance-efficiency trade-off in
contracting) and the losses of using this information, which are manifested in the
strategic interaction problem between the principals at the contracting stage.
An increase in the variance of noise trade increases trading profits and
therefore expected payoff to the principal in either case. As discussed in the
previous section, an increase in the variance of noise trade exacerbates the
strategic interaction problem between the principals, because the traders’ best-
response functions in trading intensities become flatter. As illustrated in Figure 4,
the loss due to offering aggressive wage contracts outweighs the gains of using
CPI, when the variance of noise trade is high.
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Figure 4: The solid line plots expected payoff to the principal when performance
information is released and contracting parameters are set such that they constitute an
equilibrium according to Section 4. The dotted line shows expected payoff when CPI is not
available. For high levels of the variance of noise trade it becomes more profitable for
principals to omit relative performance information. Parameter values are c=0.1, r=1,
Vy=Vz=1.
On the other hand, an increase in the degree of risk aversion, increases the
benefit of using CPI and mitigates the strategic interaction problem. In Figure 5
the expected payoff under optimal contracts is plotted for the case when CPI is
available (solid line) and when it is not available (dotted line). Expected payoff
increases with the degree of risk aversion when CPI is available and decreases
when CPI is not available.
We can therefore conclude that for high levels of noise trade and low levels
of risk aversion, principals are better off not using CPI. As shown in Proposition
4, one credible way to achieve this is to endogenise the choice of information
disclosure. This of course, raises the normative question of whether or not a
regulating authority should leave this choice to the principals. Our results show
that CPI increases competition between funds through an increase in equilibrium
trading intensities and hence also the information content of prices. A welfare
analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, but our model proposes a framework
CPI available
No CPI available
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for study of the interdependence of information disclosure, competition among
traders and informativeness of asset prices. 13
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Figure 5: The solid line shows expected payoff to the principal when CPI is available as a
function of the degree of risk aversion. The dotted line shows expected payoff when CPI is
not made available. As the degree of risk aversion increases, the externality problem under
CPI is mitigated and the insurance benefit of CPI increases. Hence, omitting CPI is only
beneficial for low degrees of risk aversion. Parameter values are c=0.1, Vn =Vy =Vz =1.
7. Conclusion
In the preceding study we explored the contracting problem between a risk
averse fund manager and a principal and how this contracting problem can give
rise to herding of investors’ asset allocation decisions. In our treatment, fund
managers have discretion over two sets of actions, both of which are non-
contractible. Firstly, a fund manager decides whether or not to acquire costly
information about the value of an asset. Secondly, he chooses the trading
intensity, which determines his order size as a function of his private information
about asset value.
                                                       
13
 A welfare analysis would require endogenous noise traders, which could be modelled as rational agents
with a hedging need. For a model with noise trade due to rational hedgers, see Spiegel and Subrahmanyam
(1992).
CPI available
No CPI available
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In order to model this last instance of moral hazard, we use a market maker
model similar to Kyle (1985). When designing a wage contract, a principal has to
take into account that his agent’s actions have to be implementable as a Nash
equilibrium in the trading subgame between a market maker, his own manager
and, possibly, another fund manager.
By inducing their managers to trade in the same asset, principals are
enabled to use comparative performance information to design relative wage
contracts. CPI has the benefit of improving the insurance efficiency trade-off of
the wage contract, while introducing a detrimental element of strategic interaction
between the principals. The latter arises because principals cannot commit to not
offering a wage contract to their manager that induces him to trade aggressively.
We show that principals may nonetheless induce their managers to trade in
the same market (herding), when their degree of risk aversion is high, or when the
precision of the signal for asset value is low. Furthermore, we show that the
problem of strategic interaction between principals can be overcome by
endogenising the choice of information disclosure of a fund manager’s
performance. Principals can thus be made better off when their managers are not
very risk averse or when the level of noise trade in a market is high. In both these
cases strategic interaction between principals is particularly important.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
First, we have to find the profits from trading amounts t1 and t2. From (2) we can
write
 
~ ( ~ ~ ) ( ~ ( ~ ))
~ ~ (~ ~ ~ ) ~ (~ ~ (~ ~ ))
pi λ
pi λ
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
= + − = + − +
= + − = + − +
t y z p t y z t n
t y z p t y z t n
A A A A A A A
B B B B B B B
and (8)
where λA and λB are the price setting parameters by the market maker. They are
the coefficients by which the total order flow is multiplied to yield prices.
Note that manager 1 can only observe yA but not yB, which is why in
manager 2’s profits, yB and t2 enter as random variables, while t1 is non-random,
given yA .
The optimal amount of trade is the solution to
( )( )[ ]max exp ( ~ ( ~ )) ~ (~ ~ (~ ~ ))t A A A A B B B BE r t y z t n t y z t n c1 1 1 2 2− − + + − + − + − + −α β λ γ λ
Note that the random variables xB, nA and nB are independent, which allows
us to rewrite expected utility as
( )( )[ ] ( )( )[ ]EU E r t y z t n E r t x t n cA A A A B B B= − − + + − + − − − + −exp ( ~ ( ~ )) exp ~ (~ (~ ~ ))α β λ γ λ1 1 2 2
The second expectations term is constant in t1, which allows us to treat it as
a constant for the maximisation problem. This is a special feature of CARA utility
and simplifies the analysis, because we can now analyse the certainty equivalent
of expected utility.
Thus, t1 is the solution to
max
t1
CE = α -c + βt1yA - βλAt12 - r/2*(βt1)2(VAz +λA2 VAn )
The first-order condition of this optimisation problem is
βyA - 2βλAt1 - rβ2t1(VAz +λA2 VAn ) = 0
Which yields the solution
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( )t
y
r V V
A
A A
z
A A
n1 22
=
+ +λ β λ
Thus t yN N A1 1= δ
with ( )δ λ β λ1 1 2
1
2
N
A
N
A
z
A
N
A
n
r V V
=
+ +
 (9)
This proves the first part of the proposition.
For the following derivation of the price setting strategy, the subscripts for
asset and trader are suppressed, since only one trader and one asset matter. The
market maker sets price equal to expected value of the asset conditional on order
flow, given his knowledge of the contracting parameters and knowing that only
one informed trader submits an order in his market.
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )~ ~ ~ ~
~ ~
,
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~ ~ ~p E x t n
Cov y z y n
Var y n
y n y n= + =
+ +
+
+ ≡ +
δ
δ
δ λ δ
Since asset value and noise trade are independent,
λ δ
δ
=
+
V
V V
y
y n2 .
The price setting strategy of the market maker for asset A is thus given by: 
( )~ ~ ~p t nA AN A= +λ 1 ,
where
λ δ
δ
A
N
N
A
y
N
A
y
A
n
V
V V
=
+
1
1
2 (10)
        q.e.d.
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Proof of Proposition 2:
Agent 1 receives the following wage as a function of his own and agent 2’s
trading strategy.
( )( )~ ~w t t y z pA A A1 1 1 1 1 2= + − + −α β γ (11)
where
~ ( ~ )p t t nA A A= + +λ 1 2 .
Given this, agent 1 faces the following optimisation problem:
( )( )( )[ ]max exp ( ~ ( ~ ))t A A A AE r t t y z t t n c1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2− − + − + − + + −α β γ λ
Note, that here t2 is not a random variable, because in equilibrium agent 1
knows agent 2’s trading strategy and the signal he received. Again we can use the
certainty equivalent of utility to find the optimal trading strategy.
CE = α1 -c + (β1 t1-γ1 t2)( yA  - λA( t1+ t2)) - r/2* (β1 t1-γ1 t2) 2(VAz+λA2VAn)
Taking the first-order condition and solving for t1 yields
( ) ( )( )
( )t
y t r V V
r V V
A A A
z
A A
n
A A
z
A A
n1
1 2 1 1 1 1
2
1 1
2 22
=
− − − +
+ +
β λ β γ β γ λ
β λ β λ      (12)
Since agent 2 has the same utility function as agent 1, his choice of strategy
is given by (12) with appropriately modified indices. Substituting t2 in (12) by this
formula into (12) and solving for t1 yields the result in Proposition 2, with a
trading intensity parameter given by
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )δ
λ β β γ β β β γ
β λ β β λ β λ β γ β γ λ β γ β γ1
2 1 1 1 2 2 1
1 1
2
2 2
2
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 22 2
H A
H
A
H
A
H
A
H
A
H
r B
r B r B r B r B
=
+ + +
+ + − − − − −
 (13)
where ( )B V VAz AH An= + λ 2 .
δ2H is given by (13) with indeces changed appropriately.
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As before the coefficient on order flow that determines prices, is the
regression coefficient of asset value on observed order flow:
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )~ ~ ~ ~ ~
~
, ( ) ~ ~
( ) ~ ~ ( )
~ ~ ( ) ~ ~p E x t t n Cov x y n
Var y n
y n y n= + + =
+ +
+ +
+ + ≡ + +1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2 1 2
δ δ
δ δ
δ δ λ δ δ
hence,
( )
( )λ
δ δ
δ δ
A
H
H H
A
y
H H
A
y
A
n
V
V V
=
+
+ +
1 2
1 2
2 (14)
q.e.d.
For the proof of Proposition 3 and Lemma 2, we need to calculate the
expectation of exponential utility when wage is distributed as a quadratic function
of normally distributed random variables. To this end we use Lemma 1, which
gives a formula to calculate this expectation. A similar lemma and proof can be
found for example in Bray (1981).
Lemma 1: Let u be an m dimensional vector of normally distributed random
variables with variance-covariance matrix ∑. Wage w is a quadratic function of u,
α is the non-random part of wage and c the cost of information acquisition.
Expected utility is then given by
( ) ( )EU r c= − − −−Σ A 12 exp ( )α
where A is given by
r w c( ( ) )u u u− + ′ −12 1Σ =1/2 u'Au + r(α-c).
Proof: Expected utility can be written as
( )EU K dm
m
= − −
−
ℜ
∫12 2
1
2
( ) exppi Σ u         (15)
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and K r w c= − + ′ −( ( ) )u u u12 1Σ              (16)
This simply stems from multiplying the utility function with the density
function for multivariate normally distributed random variables.
The next step is to rearrange K such that it is possible to carry out the
integration. Thus, define A such that
K = 1/2 u'Au + r(α-c),
Next we carry out the following transformation 
A = BB'.
Then we substitute u in expected utility (15) by q = Bu'
This yields
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
exp exp )
exp ) exp )
− = − ′ − −
= − ′ − − = − −
ℜ ℜ
−
ℜ
−
∫ ∫
∫
K d r c d
r c d r c
m m
m
m
u u Au u
A q q q A
1
2
1
2
1
2 2
1
22
(
( (
α
α pi α
(17)
A sufficient condition for the convergence of the integral is that the matrix A is
positive definite.
q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Suppose w.l.o.g. that principal P1 induces l1 =A. From (9) we can see that
the agent’s trading strategy is independent of the other agent’s actions. Hence, the
contracting problem between principal and agent i is independent from that of
principal and agent j (i≠j). Moreover, γ does not enter δN as an argument and
trading profits of the agents are independently distributed. Hence, there is no gain
from relative performance contracts and γ1N  = 0.
In order to evaluate the incentive compatibility constraint (IC) we need to
calculate the expected utility of the agent under a given contract, taking into
account his subsequently chosen trading strategy.
30
Agent F1's ex ante (i.e. before observing yA) wage is a non-normally distributed
random variable
( )( )~ ~ ~ ~ ~w y x y nN A A AN N A A1 1 1 1 1= + − +α β δ λ δ
Under a given contract and equilibrium in the trading game, the agent’s
expected utility can be calculated with the help of Lemma 2:
   ( ) ( )EU r cN A= − − −−Σ A N 12 1exp ( )α    (18)
where
( )
AN =
+ − −
−






1 2 1
1 0
0 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1
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r r r
r
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n
β δ δ λ β δ β δ λ
β δ
β δ λ
and
Σ A
A
y
A
z
A
n
V
V
V
=






0 0
0 0
0 0
Moreover, δ1 and λA are given from Proposition 1.
Furthermore, because of the particular form of matrix AN, a necessary and
sufficient condition for AN to be positive semidefinite is |AN|>0.
The participation constraint (PC) can thus be written as
( ) ( )− − − ≥ − −−Σ A r c rWA N 12 1 1exp ( ) exp( )α (19)
Moreover, using (18) the incentive compatibility constraint (IC) can be written as
( ) ( )− − − ≥ − −−Σ A r c rA N 12 1 1exp ( ) exp( )α α (20)
Substituting the binding inequality (20) into (19) yields
α1  ≥ W1.
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Since α1 cancels out in (20), the optimal choice of α1  makes (19) binding. Hence,
α1
N
=W1.
In order to calculate the optimal β1  rewrite (20) as
|∑A||AN| ≥ exp(2rc)
Calculating |∑A||AN| yields
1+2rVyβ1δ1(1-λAδ1) - r2β12δ12(Vz+λA2Vn)Vy ≥ exp(2rc) (21)
Suppose |AN| < 0. In that case (19) could never be satisfied. Hence, every contract
that satisfies (19) features |AN|>0 and therefore the formula in Lemma 2 can be
applied.
Substituting (9) into (21) and rearranging the terms yields
β δ1 1 2 1≥ −exp( )rc
rV A
y (22)
Now calculate the principal’s expected payoff, by first calculating expected
trading profits
( )( )~ ~ ~ ~ ~pi δ λ δ
pi δ δ
δ δ
δ
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2
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y A
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y
N
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y
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n
N
y x y n
E
V
V V
V
V V
V V
= − +
= −
+



 = +
the expected value of which is (23)
Thus, using (23) and (P) we can write
( )EB V V
V V
N A
n
A
y
N
A
y
A
n
N
1 1
1
2 1 11= −
+
−β
δ
δ α
which is a decreasing function in β1. Hence, the optimal β1 will be chosen such
that (22) is binding.
Substituting (10) into (9) and (9) into the binding (22) yields after some
simplifications
β β14
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32
where a rc
rV A
y≡
−exp( )2 1
Solving the quartic equation (24) for β1 yields one positive real root, given by (7)
if exp(2rc)-1≤Vy/Vz. Otherwise no real root exists, which means that no β exists
that satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint.
q.e.d.
Lemma 2: The incentive compatibility constraint (IC) for agent F1 in the case of
herding can be written as14
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )[ ]
1 2 1
2 1 2 1
1 1 1 2 1 2
2
1 1 1 2
2 2
1 2 2
2
1
2
2
2 2
+ − − + − − + ≥
− − − +
rV r V V V
rc rV r V V V
y z n y
y z n y
β δ γ δ λ δ δ β δ γ δ λ
γ δ λδ γ δ λexp( )
where δ1, δ2, λ are given by (13) and (14).
Proof:
The incentive compatibility constraint can be written as
EU EUH H NI≥ → (25)
where the LHS of (25) denotes expected utility under information acquisition and
accordingly optimal trading. The RHS denotes expected utility when no
information is acquired. The best trading strategy in that case is not to trade at all,
since this minimises the riskiness of wage.
Agent 1’s wage is
( ) ( )( )( )~ ~ ~ ~ ~w y x y n1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2= + − − + +α β δ γ δ λ δ δ (26)
With the help of Lemma 2 we can write expected utility of agent 1 under
information acquisition as
                                                       
14
 Subscripts for the asset are omitted, as only one asset is relevant here.
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( ) ( )EU r cH = − − −−Σ H A H 12 1exp ( )α (27)
with
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and  HΣ =
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Next, we derive expected utility for an agent who deviates from a herding
equilibrium by not acquiring information at all. Agent 2’s profits are affected by
agent 1’s decision not to acquire information and not to trade. This is because
total order flow changes as agent 1 ceases to trade, which in turn affects prices.
Expected utility can be derived straightforwardly by setting δ1=0 in (28).
( ) ( )EU rH NI H→ → −= − −Σ A H NI 12 1exp α
with
( )
A H NI→ =
− − −
−
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(29)
Calculation of the determinants and rearranging of the inequality (25) yield the
desired result. q.e.d.
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